Kennecott Copper Corporation and Bingham and Garfield Railway Company v. State Tax Commission : Plaintiffs\u27 Reply to Brief of Defendant in Answer to Plaintiffs\u27 Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1950
Kennecott Copper Corporation and Bingham and
Garfield Railway Company v. State Tax
Commission : Plaintiffs' Reply to Brief of
Defendant in Answer to Plaintiffs' Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. C. Parsons; Wm. M. McCrea; A. D. Moffat; Calvin A. Behle; Attorneys for Plaintiffs;
This Reply to Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply to Response to Petition for Rehearing, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm., No. 7298 (Utah Supreme Court, 1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1065
7298. 
Case No. 7298 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOT'T COPPER oCOR-
PORATION, a corporation, and 
BINGHAM AND GARFIELD 
RAILWAY COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
PlJaimti ff s I 
vs. 
STATE TAX OOMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
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turbeJ by the opinion of the Court on the issues 
so far presented to the Court for determination, 
we venture to suggest that Kenneeott 's worst 
fears are still to be realized." 
That prophecy is delivered with shocking presump-
tion, assurance and effrontery. ''Our worst fears'' were 
those that the Court simply did not understand what 
this case was about. Now we are confidently assured 
by counsel that we must not expect the Court to under-
stand what this case is about, which naturally defendant 
concludes will inure to defendant's benefit and that there 
is nothing we can do about it. 
We have not despaired of this Court's purpose to 
be advised of what this case is about, notwithstanding 
this defendant's very consistent effort to confuse. 
Counsel strut naively, but if we are to be led to the 
slaughter, we prefer, and we think it our right, to have 
our case presented and considered by this Court upon 
all issues and on a record ·wherein all issues shall have 
been raised and tried. 
Counsel's conclusion to Defendant's Brief in Answer 
to Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing is nothing more 
than a boastful threat of what this defendant is going 
to do to plaintiff upon the trial of other issues not here 
but hereafter to be raised. The impropriety of the dis-
sertation contained within this so-called conclusion will 
be apparent, but we think this case is of sufficient seri-
ousness to warrant thorough understanding before deci-
sion. We suggest that the only course to be taken in 
fairness to this plaintiff, to the Court and to all others 
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concenwd will be the recall of the opinion rendered; 
and after correction when the Court shall have fully 
considered the limited issues presently before it, the 
remand of the case to the defendant without encun1brance 
and with instructions to embrace within the proper 
con1pass of the proceeding all issues properly to be 
raised therein and to try the case upon those issues. 
Upon the record so made, a review may he had. 
Even the defendant, at pages 20 and 21 of its Brief 
1n Answer to Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing, has 
stated that it ''deems it most unwise to concede the 
validity of any of Kennecott's various 'allocation fac-
tors' and 'accounting formulas' unless and until this 
Court has spoken,'' when ''this Court will be in the 
position where it can see this case as a finished product 
in fact and figures for 1942 and all succeeding years.'' 
The Court should be informed before decision. This 
case started out as a friendly suit seeking the Court's 
constructive opinion on issues from which it was hoped 
and expected by the Commission's then counsel that 
S·ettlement would be reached upon others not then before 
the Court. This controversy has now reached the point 
where there is nothing friendly about it; and this Court's 
present opinion is being made the excuse for unprece-
dented demands beyond the wildest imagination of any 
one; and upon which this defendant boasts before this 
Court, not only of its purpose but of its uncontrolled 
power to exact from tliis plaintiff the very maximum 
of its fantastic demands-to say the least a climate not 
friendly to great industry, investment and development. 
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L 
Point. 
Defendant's discussion of the relation of Federal 
statutes to depletion calculation under the Utah Corpora-
tion Franchise Tax Act is neither factual nor forthright; 
again consiste·ntly it is a part of this defendant's plan to 
confuse. 
What nons-ense is this. (Defendant's Brief in Answer 
to Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing, pages 6 and 7) : 
'' Vlhether depletion should be calculated on 
the basis of mill concentrates, as the Commission 
has concluded, or refined copper, as Kennecott has 
con tended, depends on what the Federal law pro-
vides. Both Kennecott and the Commission, in 
effect, have rested their cases on what the applic-
able Federal law provides with respect to deple-
tion.'' 
Let us look at the record. 
It was here stipulated that the case might be sub-
mitted to the Court on an "agreed record." We quote 
from that agreed record as follows: 
"1. Section 80-13-8(8) requires the Com-
mission to allow as a deduction 'a reasonable 
allowance for depletion and for depreciation of 
improvements, according to the peculiar condi-
tions in each case, such reasonable allowance in 
all cases to be made under rules and regulations 
to he prescribed by the Tax Commission.' Two 
methods for computation of depletion are then 
prescribed: ( 1) cost (or value), a method which 
l{ennecott has never used (Section 80-13-9 (a)) ; 
and ( 2) a percentage formula based upon net 
income, which Kennecott has consistently used 
(Section 80-13-9 (b) ) . 
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'' 2. These statutes in respect to the deple-
tion allowance have not been amended, altered 
or revised by the legislature since the Corpora-
tion Franchi:5e Tax Act was first enacted. The 
wording is in part identical with and modeled 
after the federal statute.* * * 
'' 3. X o rules or regulations have been prom-
ulgated by the Co1nn1ission Llnder the foregoing 
Section 80-13-8(8) except as hereinafter set forth. 
(R. 10-±) 
• * • 
• • ( 1) In cmnputing 'net income from the 
property' to which the percentage of 331fa is to 
be applied to cmnpute depletion under the p~r­
centage method, at no time sinee the effective date 
of the Corporation Franchise Tax Act has (R. 
105) Kennecott or any other Utah mining com-
pany deducted from gross income any profit 
attributable to smelting, refining, transportation 
and selling.* * * 
"(2) The federal statute, originally the 
Inodel for the Utah provisions, was amended by 
Congress in 1942 to provide for such an alloca-
tion, but on a basis different than that contended 
for by the Commission in this case. (I.R.C. 
~114(b) ( 4) (B).) 
"(3) For ·each year beginning with the 
effective date of the Utah Corporation Franchise 
Tax Act to and including the corporation fran-
chise tax, instructions and returns for the taxable 
year 1942 the tax return forms and instructions 
issued by the Commission in accordance with law 
provided as follows: 
'' 21. DEPLETION. The amount de-
ductible on account of depletion in Iten1 21 
in the case of metalliferous, coal and other 
hydrocarbon mines, and oil and gas wells, 
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may be based on ( 1) the cost of the property 
with respect to which depletion is claimed, or, 
if the property was acquired prior to Jan-
ua.ry 1, 1931, on the cost or the fair market 
value of the property on January 1, 1931, 
whichever is greater, or (2) the net income 
from the property during the taxable year 
computed without allowance for depletion, 
at thirty-three and one-third per cent of such 
net income, as the taxpayer may elect. * ~'j: * 
(R. 106) 
'' ( 4) For the year 1943 the Commission 
amended said instructions to read as follows: 
• * * 
''Net incmne from the property as a basis 
for the percentage limitations must be com-
puted by deducting from gross income from 
the property all deduction allowed by statute 
in com·puting taxable net income (excluding 
any allowance for depletion) to the extent 
that they are applicable to the property. The 
requisite deductions shall include overhead 
and operating expenses, development costs 
properly charged to expense, depreciation, 
taxes including Federal income taxes, losses 
sustained, etc. In cases where the taxpayer 
engages in actiYities in addition to, or de-
rives income from sources other than, min-
eral extraction, deductions not directly at-
tributable to any particular activity or source 
of income shall be fairly allocated. * * * " 
(R. 107.) 
Let us now observe the sequence In which these 
statutory enactments occurred. 
The Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act (Laws 
6 
I 
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H)31. e. 39) was passed :March 12, 1931, approved :March 
20, 1931, e:ffeetive l\Iay 1:2, 1931, and provided that "the 
first taxable year shall be the calendar year 1931 or any 
fiscal year ending during the calendar year 1931.'' 
The Federal law which was in effect in 1931 was 
the Revenue Act of 1928 ( Aet. of ~Iay 29, 1928, c. 852, 
-!3 Stat. 791-883, 26 U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Acts 1924 
to date, p. 345) and this applied to the taxable year 1928 
and succeeding taxable years 1929, 1930 and 1931. It 
provided for a reasonable allowance for depletion, 
according to the peculiar conditions in each case. 
Percentage depletion in case of mines was not allowed. 
Such depletion calculated for all mines discovered prior 
to February 28, 1913, was permitted only on the basis 
of cost or fair market value as of March 1, 1913, which-
ever was greater. In the case of mines discovered after 
February 28, 1913, the basis for depletion was fair mar-
ket value at date of discovery-not to exceed 50 per cent 
of "net income of the taxpayer (computed without al-
lowance for depletion) from the property upon which the 
discovery was made.'' 
Under the Act of 1928 Regulation 7 4 was issued, 
Article 221(h) of which provided in part that "The 
phrase 'Net Income of the taxpayer (computed without 
allowance for depletion)' means the gross income from 
the sale of all mineral products from the discovery ore 
body less the deductions in respect to the property upon 
which the discovery is made, including overhead and 
operating expenses, depreciation, taxes, losses sustained, 
etc., but excluding any allowance for depletion. If the 
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mineral ·products are not sold as raw material but are 
manufactured or converted into a refined product, the 
gross income shall be assumed to be equivalent to the 
market or field price of the raw material before conver-
sion • * • ". 
The "market or field price of the raw material be-
fore conversion'' could not exceed of eourse the ultimate 
sales price of the first commercially marketable product 
less all costs back to the raw material, the same principle 
applying as that applicable to mine evaluation discussed 
by us in Point I of Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing at 
page 15 et seq. 
The language of that part of the Revenue Act of 
19:12 (Act. of June 6, 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169-289, 26 
U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Acts 1924 to date, p. 477 et 
seq) relevant to the controversy presently before this 
Court remained unchanged until passage on F·ebruary 
2:), 1944 of the Revenue Act of 1943 (58 Stat. 21, 26 
U.S.C.A. 114(b) ( 4) (B)). Percentage depletion in the 
case of mines was allowed for the first time by the 
Revenue Act of 1932; the allowance was 15 per cent of 
the ''gross income from the property,'' not to ''exceed 
50 per cent of the net income of the taxpayer (computed 
without allowance for depletion) from the property." 
Neither gross nor net income was defined by any Act of 
Congress until passage of the Revenue Act of 1943 on 
February 25, 1944. By Regulation 77, Article 221(g), 
promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1932, it was pro-
vided that cost of processes beyond concentrating were 
required to be deducted. No mention of profit as attrib-
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utahle to any processes preceding sale of the first eom-
mereially 1narketable product occurs in any Federal act. 
The basis behind Federal percentage depletion is the 
one stated by lTnder-Secretary Paul at the tim·e the 
Bureau was pressing for allocation of profits to the 
processes beyond concentration. At that time .JJ r. Paul 
stated that the whole purpose of the attributable profits 
provision in the regulations was to bring the large pro-
ducer who performs processing beyond the concentrating 
stage on a par with the small producer who customarily 
sold his product to the sm·elter ( R. 69). As Kennecott 
deducts from the amount received for the sale of its 
product the amount charged by those who perforn1 the 
smelting, transportation, and refining, that charge in-
cludes the profit of those engaged in the processes beyond 
concentration, and those making that profit would be 
taxed by the several states wherein that profit was 
earned ( R. 66). 
It is of course the practice of custom smelters in 
purchasing ores from independent producers to charge 
not only the actual cost of smelting, but a profit, and, 
likewise, the same situation -exists with respect to trans-
portation and refining. Having arrived at the cost of 
these operations and having determined the amount of 
profit which it wishes to make in peTforming this work, 
the smelter then deducts from the market or sales price 
of the metals contained in the ore purchased, the total of 
of these costs and profiits and the result is the price 
the smelter will pay for ore purchased. 
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In Kennecott's case precisely that situation exists. 
The only difference is that Kennecott retains ownership 
in the metals, which it sells or has sold for it, and from 
the price received it deducts the amount charged for 
smelting, freight and refining, which deduction includes 
all the profit earned through the rendition of those serv-
ices. Accordingly the amount upon which depletion is 
calculated in Kennecott's case is on precisely the same 
basis as is all ore purchased by the smelter from inde-
pendent producers. 
The only profit earned having been once deducted, 
will this Court approve a second deduction as profit, 
which is not profit at all, of some amount arbitrarily 
assessed by this defendant. If so, by what authority 
and why1 The elimination from Kennecott's net income 
of this second deduction, which is not profit and which 
is not attributable at all to Kennecott's operation, could 
be nothing more than an arbitrary seizure, without rhyme 
or reason, of a part of Kennecott's net income for no 
purpose whatever except the arbitrary reduction of 
Kennecott's depletion factor and the resulting palpable 
discrimination against Kennecott. As quoted on page 
23 of Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing, where Ken-
necott its·elf has engaged in the processing of its pro-
duction beyond the concentrating stage, the Federal gov-
ernment has allocated profit to those operations, but 
otherwise it certainly has not, and this is exactly in line 
with the Federal regulations and the practice of the 
Internal Revenue Department. 
10 
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The effort of this defendant to assig-n profit to these 
processes where they have not been performed by the 
taxpayer and where the only profit earned has already 
once been deducted as part of the cost, is contrary to 
the practice of the Internal Revenue Department itself 
and is without precedent or authority whatsoever. \Ve 
know of no plainer case of adnlinistrative asstunption of 
legislative powers. X ow by its own statements defendant 
is caught red-handed, invoking a non-existent law in an 
attempt to confuse this Court into endorsement of the 
changes defendant proposes without legislative sanction 
and contrary to administrative practice. 
It must be thoroughly understood by this defen-
dant, and now evident to this Court, that the Utah Cor-
poration Franchise Tax Act, passed March 12, 1931, 
could not h~ve been ''modeled'' after any Act of Con-
gress other than the Rev-enue Act of 1928. One will 
search that Act and all practices thereunder in vain 
for even the remotest thought of allocating to smelting, 
transportation, refining and sales, or any of those se'rv-
ic.es, any item of profit. Congress attempted nothing of 
that kind by the Revenue Act of 1928, nor did the Utah 
legislature have even remotely in mind any such fan-
tastic effort. The Utah Act passed .March 12, 1931, 
could not have been "modeled" after an Act of Congress 
not then in existence. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
n. 
Point. 
This defendant proceeds further in the course of its 
plan to confuse. 
On page 4 of Defendant'~ Brief in Answer to Plain-
tiffs' Petition for Rehearing it is stated that Kennecott 
did certain things in connection with the production of 
cop'P'er from its propeTty at Bingham. It is important 
that it be dearly understood that, of the processes 
enumerated, Kennecott mined and milled the ore. The 
s1nelting, transportation and refining was done by others 
for Kennecott; and the selling was by a subsidiary of 
Kennecott, all profit by reason of sales being meticulously 
eliminated. The entire profit of the operation is re'alized 
only when the copper is sold. Kennecott does not engage 
in fabricating or manufacturing. Part of its production 
after sale as copper, is fabricated or manufactured into 
other forms by its suhsidiaries, Kennecott Wire and 
Cable and Chase ·Copper and Brass. All copper is sold 
either in the open n1arket or at the going market price. 
As none of the product is sold before the copper is re-
fined, any computation of amount received must of 
necessity start with the refined product. Not only is that 
true in our immediate problem, but as well and equally 
of necessity in computing the value of mines for any 
purpose. The sales price for metal production must be 
the point from which all calculations are made whereby 
to arrive at value. 
We question that even this defendant can under-
stand that paragraph in the middle of page 13 of its 
12 
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brief wherein it is stated that defendant's fonnula works 
in Kennecott's favor by attributing too much net incmne 
to the activities defendant chooses to denominate • 'post-
mining.'' The reverse of course must be true on defen-
dant's theory, for if upon that theory too much profit 
were attributed to those activities the depletion allow-
able to Kennecott would be correspondingly reduced. 
On the bottom of page 14 and top of page 15 of 
defendant's brief reference is made to iron ore. The 
Federal regulations provide specifically that where there 
is such a field price thrut will be the basis for calculating 
the amount of depletion allowable instead of taking the 
sale of the finished product and deducting the costs or 
pro~esses beyond the concentrating stage. Iron ore in 
that industry is the first commel'cially Inarketable prod-
uct. 
We must observe that the allocation factor of ·66.~)26 
referred to by defendant on page 20 of its Answer to 
Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing as "Kennecott's 'allo-
cation factor' ", is no nwre Kennecott's factor than it 
is that of this defendant. That was the allocation factor 
to which defendant and this plaintiff agreed as part of 
their settlement of _jfay 27, 1942, and as such applied the 
same in the franchise tax computations for the years 
1934 to 1941, both inclusive. In harmony with that s·et-
tlement the allocation factor was used by Kennecott 
for the purpose of its fra~chise tax returns for each the 
years 1942 et seq. Repudiating the principles adopted 
by the settlement of May 27, 1942, this defendant by 
letter of March 10, 1945 embarked upon a course of 
18 
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redetennination, of which the present controversy is an 
incident. (R. 103). 
On the bottom of page 15 some high sounding lan-
guage is used. The legislature has not been generous 
to any extent. Depletion is an inescapable loss and must 
be deducted before profit can be determined. The amount 
of investment has nothing whatever to do with the total 
value subject to depletion; it is value as of January 1, 
1931 which is subject to depletion. 
This plaintiff seeks no special treatment, but it does 
demand that the same ruJ:es be applied to it as are ap~ 
plied to other mining companies. This plaintiff is en-
titled to and it must receive the same consideration 
accorded by law to those who sell their ores direct to the 
smelter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PARSONS, 
WM. 11. McCREA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
14 
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